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Abstract—Recently, Kim and Chung proposed a more secure
remote user authentication scheme, which is an improvement
over Yoon-Yoo’s scheme to remedy their security ﬂaws, such as
leak of password and vulnerabilities to the masquerading user
attack, the masquerading server attack, and the stolen-veriﬁer
attack. In this paper, we will show that Kim-Chung’s improved
scheme is vulnerable to the ofﬂine password guessing attack.
In addition, the scheme does not possess the feature of secret
key forward secrecy as they claimed. Hence, Kim-Chung’s
scheme is also subject to the masquerading user attack and
the masquerading server attack as well. Moreover, their scheme
does not generate session keys for secure communications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the prevalence of computer networks all over the
world, many network services are provided by remote
servers. However, for a secure network system, it needs a
remote authentication mechanism to validate the legitimacy
of communicating parties. Since Lamport [1] proposed his
prominent work in 1981, many researchers have proposed
new schemes to improve the efﬁciency and security of
remote authentication.
In 2002, Chien et al. [2] proposed a very efﬁcient remote
mutual authentication scheme. However, as demonstrated by
Hsu [3], [4], Chien et al.’s scheme is susceptible to the
parallel session attack. Later, Lee et al. [5], [6] improved
Chien et al.’s scheme to get rid of this drawback. Shortly,
Yoon and Yoo [7] pointed out that Lee et al.’s scheme is
vulnerable to the masquerading server attack and is insecure
in changing passwords. They then proposed an enhancement
to cope with these weaknesses. Recently, Kim and Chung
[8] discovered that Yoon-Yoo’s scheme is vulnerable to the
masquerading server attack, the masquerading user attack,
and the stolen veriﬁer attack, and it is easy to leak passwords.
Besides, they also improved Yoon-Yoo’s scheme to eliminate
these security ﬂaws.
In this paper, we will show that Kim-Chung’s improved
scheme is vulnerable to the ofﬂine password guessing attack.
In addition, their scheme fails to achieve the property of
secret key forward secrecy as they claimed. Therefore, their
scheme is also subject to both the masquerading server attack
and the masquerading user attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we brieﬂy review Kim-Chung’s authentication scheme. In
Section 3, we show the security weaknesses of Kim-Chung’s
scheme. Finally, we conclude this paper in the last section.
II. REVIEW OF KIM-CHUNG’S SCHEME
In this section, we brieﬂy review the remote user authen-
tication scheme proposed by Kim and Chung in 2009 [8].
Kim-Chung’s scheme, summarized in Fig. 1, consists of four
phases: registration, login, veriﬁcation, and password change
phases. For convenience, the notation used is listed below.
• U : a user (client)
• ID: U ’s identity
• PW : U ’s password
• S: a remote server
• x: the secret key of S
• h(): a hash function
• ⊕: bitwise XOR operation
• →: a common (insecure) communication channel
• ⇒: a secure communication channel
• X → Y : {M}: X sends a message M to Y over a
common communication channel
A. Registration Phase
In this phase, the user U initially registers with the server
S by performing the following steps.
(1) U ⇒ S : {ID, PW}. U selects his ID and PW and
sends them to S over a secure channel.
(2) After receiving ID and PW , S computes K1 =
h(ID⊕x)⊕N and K2 = h(ID⊕x⊕N)⊕h(PW ⊕
h(PW )), where N is a random number unique to the
user U . Then, S computes R = K1 ⊕ h(PW ).
(3) S stores the secure information K1, K2, R, and h()
into U ’s smart card CARD.
(4) S ⇒ U : {CARD}. S delivers the smart card CARD
over a secure channel to U to complete the registration
procedure.
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User (U) Server (S)
Registration phase: 
Select ID, PW {ID, PW }
K1 = h(ID  x)  N
K2 = h(ID  x  N)  h(PW  h(PW))
R = K1  h(PW) 
Store K1, K2, R, h() in smart card {smart card }
Login phase: 
Input ID, PW 
C1 = R  h(PW) 
Reject login if C1 z stored K1 
Acquire current timestamp T1 
C1ƍ = K2  h(PW  h(PW)) 
C2 = h(C1ƍ  T1) 
{ID, T1, C1, C2}
Check validity of ID  
Check freshness of T1 
N' = C1  h(ID  x) 
Terminate if C2 z h(h(ID  x  N')  T1) 
Acquire current timestamp T2 
C3 = h(h(ID  x  N')  C2  T2) 
Verification phase: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Check freshness of T2 
Terminate if C3 z h(C1ƍ  C2  T2)
{T2, C3} 
User (U) Smart Card 
Password change phase: 
Input ID, PW 
 
 
 
Input PW' 
{ID, PW }
K1ƍ = R  h(PW)
Reject change if K1ƍ z stored K1 
R' = K1ƍ  h(PW' ) 
K2ƍ = K2  h(PW  h(PW))  
 h(PW'  h(PW' )) 
Rĸ R' 
K2 ĸ K2ƍ 
{PW' } 
Figure 1. Kim-Chung’s remote user authentication scheme
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B. Login Phase
In this phase, the user U sends a login request message
to the server S to access the services provided by S.
(1) U inserts his smart card, CARD, into a card reader
and inputs his ID and PW .
(2) The smart card ﬁrst computes C1 = R ⊕ h(PW ).
If C1 is not equal to the stored K1, then the smart
card rejects the login request. Otherwise, it computes
C ′1 = K2⊕h(PW ⊕h(PW )) and C2 = h(C ′1⊕T1),
where T1 is the current timestamp.
(3) U → S : {ID, T1, C1, C2}.
C. Veriﬁcation Phase
In this phase, the server S veriﬁes the authenticity of the
login request sent by U , and ﬁnally U will in turn verify S
as well to achieve mutual authentication.
(1) Upon receiving the login message {ID, T1, C1, C2}
at timestamp T ′1, S ﬁrst checks the validity of ID
and the freshness of T1, where the freshness of T1 is
checked by verifying whether T ′1−T1 ≤ ΔT and ΔT
is a valid time interval.
(2) If ID is not valid or T1 is not fresh, S terminates
the current session. Otherwise, S computes N ′ =
C1⊕h(ID⊕x) and checks if h(h(ID⊕x⊕N ′)⊕T1)
is equal to the received C2. If it is not, S terminates
the current session. Otherwise, S successfully authen-
ticates U and computes C3 = h(h(ID ⊕ x ⊕ N ′) ⊕
C2 ⊕ T2), where T2 is the current timestamp.
(3) S → U : {T2, C3}.
(4) On the receipt of the message {T2, C3} from S at
timestamp T ′2, U ﬁrst checks the freshness of T2 in the
same way as above. If T2 is not fresh, U terminates
the current session. Otherwise, U checks if h(C ′1 ⊕
C2 ⊕ T2) is equal to the received C3. It it is not, U
terminates the current session. Otherwise, U now has
successfully authenticated S.
D. Password Change Phase
In this phase, if the user U wants to change his password,
he performs the following steps.
(1) U inserts his smart card, CARD, into a card reader
and then inputs his ID and PW .
(2) The smart card computes K ′1 = R ⊕ h(PW ) and
compares K ′1 with the stored K1. If they are not equal,
the smart card rejects the password change request.
Otherwise, U inputs a new password PW ′.
(3) The smart card then computes R′ = K ′1⊕h(PW ′) and
K ′2 = K2⊕h(PW ⊕h(PW ))⊕h(PW ′⊕h(PW ′)).
Then, it replaces R and K2 with R′ and K ′2, respec-
tively.
III. SECURITY WEAKNESSES
There are two assumptions made by Kim-Chung’s scheme
[8]:
• It is assumed that an attacker has total control over the
communication channel between the user U and the
remote server S. In other words, the attacker can insert,
delete, alter, or intercept any messages transmitted in
the channel.
• As reported in [9], [10], the values stored in a smart
card could be extracted by monitoring its power con-
sumption. Thus, it is also assumed that the attacker can
steal the user’s smart card to extract the secret values
stored in the smart card.
In the following discussions of the security ﬂaws of Kim-
Chung’s remote user authentication scheme, based on the
above two assumptions, we assume that an attacker Ua can
extract the secret values {K1,K2, R} stored in the user U ’s
smart card, and he can intercept the login request message
{ID, T1, C1, C2} from the user U and the reply message
{T2, C3} from the server S.
A. Ofﬂine Password Guessing Attack
A remote user authentication scheme which is vulnerable
to the ofﬂine password guessing attack must satisfy the
following two conditions: (1) the user’s password is weak,
and (2) there exists a piece of password-related information
used as a comparison target for password guessing.
In Kim-Chung’s scheme, a user is allowed to choose
his own password at will during the registration phase;
the user usually tends to select a password that is easily
remembered for his convenience. Hence, these easy-to-
remember passwords, which are called weak passwords, are
potentially vulnerable to the password guessing attack, in
which an adversary can try to guess the user’s password
from a dictionary of all possible weak passwords and then
verify his guess.
Besides, since the secret values stored in the smart card
are assumed to be able to be extracted, an attacker Ua can
steal the user U ’s smart card to obtain the stored secret
values K1, K2, and R. Then, the attacker Ua can guess
the value of PW by verifying his guess using the equation
h(PW ) = R⊕K1.
On the other hands, the user U ’s password can be guessed
by the useful features provided by Kim-Chung’s scheme,
such as early detection of incorrect password or secure
password change. In Kim-Chung’s scheme, an incorrect
password PW ∗ can be detected earlier by the smart card
in the login phase by checking whether C1 is equal to the
stored K1, without resorting to the checking of the remote
server, where C1 = R ⊕ h(PW ∗). If they are not equal,
the smart card will reject the login request. Therefore, the
attacker Ua can steal the user U ’s smart card and then launch
the ofﬂine password guessing attack by providing guessed
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passwords. If the smart card accepts the login request, then
the current guessed-password is the correct one. In a similar
way, the feature of secure password change provided in Kim-
Chung’s scheme is also vulnerable to the ofﬂine password
guessing attack.
Once the password PW is known to the attacker, Kim-
Chung’s scheme is subject to the masquerading server attack
and the masquerading user attack, as shown in Subsections
III-C and III-D, respectively.
B. Secret Key Forward Secrecy
Kim and Chung claimed that their scheme provides the
security feature of secret key forward secrecy; that is, even
if the secret key x of the server S happens to be revealed,
an attacker cannot impersonate other users by using the
revealed key x. However, this claim is not true. If x is
revealed, an attacker can derive the random number N
unique to the user U by computing N = C1 ⊕ h(ID ⊕ x),
where ID and C1 can be obtained from the intercepted login
request message over the communication channel. Once,
N is known, the attacker can impersonate the server S
(masquerading server attack) as well as impersonate the user
U (masquerading user attack) as shown in the following
subsections.
C. Masquerading Server Attack
If an attacker knows PW or N , he can impersonate the
server S in the following two ways. If the attacker only
obtains PW , he can ﬁrst compute K = K2 ⊕ h(PW ⊕
h(PW )), which is equal to h(ID ⊕ x ⊕ N). If he only
knows N , he can direct compute K = h(ID ⊕ x ⊕ N).
Then, the attacker computes a fake C∗3 = h(K ⊕C2 ⊕ T ∗2 ),
where T ∗2 is the current timestamp and C2 is obtained from
the intercepted login message. Finally, the attacker sends a
forged reply message {T ∗2 , C∗3} to the user U to impersonate
the server S.
D. Masquerading User Attack
Similarly, an attacker can impersonate U if he obtains
PW or N by the following two methods. He can compute
K = K2 ⊕ h(PW ⊕ h(PW )) by using PW only or
K = h(ID ⊕ x ⊕N) by using N only. Then, the attacker
computes a bogus C∗2 = h(K⊕T ∗1 ), where T ∗1 is the current
timestamp. Finally, the attacker transmits the forged login
request message {ID, T ∗1 , C1, C∗2} to the remote server S
to pretend to be the user U .
Note that once the attacker can impersonate both the
server S and the user U , Kim-Chung’s scheme is also
vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years, Yoon and Yoo proposed a remote user
authentication scheme with some good features such as
providing mutual authentication, secret key forward secrecy,
and fast detection of wrong password. However, Kim and
Chung pointed out that Yoon-Yoo’s scheme is vulnerable
to the masquerading user attack, the masquerading server
attack, the stolen veriﬁer attack, and leak of password. They
then presented an improvement to remove these security
ﬂaws while preserving all the merits of Yoon-Yoo’s scheme.
In this paper, we have shown that Kim-Chung’s improved
scheme is vulnerable to the ofﬂine password guessing attack.
In addition, the scheme does not possess the feature of secret
key forward secrecy as claimed. Therefore, their scheme
is also susceptible to the masquerading server attack and
the masquerading user attack as well. Furthermore, their
scheme does not provide session key exchanges for secure
communications.
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